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Non-technical summary 
 
 
Theoretical analyses of national tax policy in an environment of globalization assume that 
political decision makers have an unbiased perception of constraints. In this paper, by con-
trast, we document a strong ideological bias among policy makers with respect to the per-
ceived mobility of international tax bases, which in turn influences directly and indirectly the 
perceived national autonomy in tax setting and preferences for policy reform. Our findings are 
based on an original survey of members of the German national parliament (Bundestag) relat-
ing to their views on business tax policy. We document not only an ideological bias in the 
perception of international mobility of tax bases, but more generally determine the factors that 
influence the views of policy makers.  
The survey was conducted in late 2006 and early 2007, shortly before the Bundestag 
debated and voted on a company tax reform bill. In the survey we ask questions relating to 
three possible channels of interaction between globalization and national tax policy, which we 
call the globalization and tax policy channels: i) the role of real corporate mobility, ii) the 
extent of international profit shifting, and iii) the role of voters’ awareness of tax policy in 
other countries. The questions correspond to relevant hypotheses identified earlier in the lit-
erature, namely tax competition for real investment, tax competition for paper profits, and 
yardstick competition. In addition, we are interested in the perceived autonomy of German tax 
policy and the desirability of an EU minimum corporate tax rate. 
We analyse the survey data in a two step procedure. In a first step, we ask how the 
perception of globalization channels is influenced on by the MP’s party membership and a 
number of other control variables. Among the latter are variables measuring the individual 
MP’s education, membership in specialized committees, years in Bundestag and other charac-
teristics. In a second step, we check how the assessment of tax policy autonomy and prefer-
ences for minimum taxes in the EU are related to perceived globalization restrictions and 
other variables among which again party membership receives a special attention. 
Our main findings are as follows: First, ideological bias matters in explaining the poli-
ticians’ views on the three globalization and tax policy channels, and the bias matters quanti-
tatively more than most other control variables such as the politician’s profession, member-
ship in economics related parliament committees, years in parliament, and educational degree. 
For example, there is a clear left-right bias in perception of real corporate mobility in response 
to taxation. More left-wing politicians believe that taxation plays less of a role in company 
location decisions than right-wing politicians. We also obtain interesting insights with respect 
 
to the impact of the election mode by exploiting a particular feature of the German electoral 
system: About fifty percent of legislators in the German parliament are elected directly in 
districts, while the other half is elected via a party list, where seats are allocated to parties 
based on vote shares. Interestingly, party list MPs with arguably less direct contacts to re-
gional constituencies perceive a lower real tax elasticity of companies compared to directly 
elected politicians. 
Second, the yardstick competition hypothesis finds relatively little support in the Ger-
man Bundestag (see Besley and Case, 1995, for the seminal contribution and empirical evi-
dence for the U.S.). In general, German politicians don’t believe that voters care much about 
other countries’ tax policies. Controlling again for the politician’s mode of election, however, 
we find that directly elected politicians believe more strongly in the role of voters’ perception 
of other countries’ tax policies.  
We get our third main finding when we proceed to explain the perceived degree of na-
tional autonomy in tax setting and use the answers to the three previous questions (the chan-
nels of globalization and tax policy) as explanatory variables. In addition, we also allow party 
membership to directly explain the responses by legislators. We find again a strong direct 
ideological bias. Ideology matters also indirectly, in particular via the profit shifting channel. 
Hence, party membership matters both directly and indirectly.  
Finally, we use the same approach to explain preferences for EU tax harmonization 
and find that minimum tax rates for companies are more strongly favoured by left wing par-
ties, even after controlling for the three globalization and tax policy channels. The direct ide-
ology effect is quantitatively more important than the three channels of globalization. Perhaps 
surprisingly, directly elected politicians tend to be more in favour of minimum tax rates.  
Several robustness checks indicate that our key results are not distorted by a possible 
selection bias in the survey and that party membership in the Bundestag has indeed an infor-
mation content with respect to the MP’s tax ideology.  
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Abstract: The process of globalization has an important impact on national tax policies. Most 
of the literature on taxation of capital in open economies does not focus directly on the politi-
cal decision making process and assumes that the desired tax policy is responding to objective 
underlying tradeoffs. Based on an original survey of members of German national parliament 
(Bundestag) in 2006/7 we document a strong ideological bias among policy makers with re-
spect to the perceived mobility of international tax bases (mobility of real capital and shifting 
of paper profits). Ideology via party affiliation influences also directly and indirectly the per-
ceived national autonomy in tax setting and preferences for a EU minimum tax for companies. 
There seems little consensus as to what the efficiency cost of capital taxation in open econo-
mies are, even though our survey falls in period of extensive debate about and actual adoption 
of a company tax reform bill in Germany.  
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1. Introduction 
 
International mobility of capital and firms restricts national tax autonomy and puts pressure 
on governments to reduce taxes on mobile factors. The enormous literature on international 
tax competition attests to this hypothesis (see Wilson (1999) for a survey). Empirically, statu-
tory corporate tax rates have substantially declined in many countries over the last 20 to 30 
years, while effective tax rates have declined less so due to base broadening measures (Deve-
reux et al. (2002)). How should society change tax policy in response to the increasing inter-
national mobility? We might  expect that all individuals reduce their desired tax rates on capi-
tal because the efficiency cost of taxation have gone up, but the desired level of taxation 
should vary by individual, perhaps due to differences in preferences over an equity–efficiency 
trade off.1 A person with little capital income may favour a higher tax on capital than a person 
with little capital income (see Persson and Tabellini, 1992, for a tax competition model with 
heterogenous voters, and Meltzer and Richard, 1981, for a closed economy model on equilib-
rium redistribution when individuals differ in income). Yet, the efficiency costs of levying 
taxes on mobile factors are assumed to be objective. 
In this paper, by contrast, we document a strong ideological bias among policy makers 
with respect to the perceived mobility of international tax bases, which in turn influences di-
rectly and indirectly the perceived national autonomy in tax setting and preferences for policy 
reform. In contrast to previous literature there seems little consensus as to what the efficiency 
cost of capital taxation in open economies are. Our findings are based on an original survey of 
members of the German national parliament (Bundestag) relating to their views on business 
tax policy. We document not only an ideological bias in the perception of international mobil-
ity of tax bases, but more generally determine the factors that influence the views of policy 
makers. Our survey identified the name of the member of parliament (MP) and hence we con-
dition the results on various control variables such as education and information available to 
policy makers. Overall, our paper raises important questions about the way economists model 
tax policy decision making. The survey approach appears also fruitful in studying the empiri-
cal validity of hypotheses regarding tax policy decisions in open economies. 
The survey was conducted in late 2006 and early 2007. While not all members of par-
liament can be expected to be specialists on tax policy, reform of company taxation was put 
high on the agenda by the grand coalition governing Germany since late 2005. For this reason 
various tax reform proposals were discussed in the public during 2005-7 and a specific busi-
                                                 
1  This assumes that there is some reason to levy a positive tax on capital in an open economy, for example, be-
cause the country is large or pure profits are captured by the tax. 
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ness tax reform bill was passed by the Bundestag a few months after our survey in May 2007. 
The timing of our questionnaire falls thus in a period of general awareness about the interna-
tional dimension of tax policy. The reason for the present government’s priority of reforming 
company taxation is the high level of taxation in Germany, despite an earlier reform under the 
previous government that already lowered the tax burden for corporations and noncorpora-
tions. Both in terms of statutory and effective marginal corporate tax rates Germany ranks 
highest among EU countries, and after the Eastern enlargement of the EU Germany borders or 
is close to countries with much lower tax rates (see for example Devereux et al., 2002, and for 
more recent data Haufler, 2006). Huizinga and Laeven (2007) suggest that profit shifting by 
multinational companies is indeed a major problem in Europe, and in particular for Germany, 
whose fiscal revenue losses are estimated to be about 3.5 billion Euros.   
In the survey we ask questions relating to three possible channels of interaction be-
tween globalization and national tax policy, which we  call the globalization and tax policy 
channels: i) the role of real corporate mobility, ii) the extent of international profit shifting, 
and iii) the role of voters’ awareness of tax policy in other countries. The questions corre-
spond to relevant hypotheses identified earlier in the literature, namely tax competition for 
real investment, tax competition for paper profits, and yardstick competition. In addition, we 
are interested in the perceived autonomy of German tax policy and the desirability of an EU 
minimum corporate tax rate.  
Our main findings are as follows: First, ideological bias matters in explaining the poli-
ticians’ views on the three globalization and tax policy channels, and the bias matters quanti-
tatively more than most other control variables such as the politician’s profession, member-
ship in economics related parliament committees, years in parliament, and educational degree. 
For example, there is a clear left-right bias in perception of real corporate mobility in response 
to taxation. More left-wing politicians believe that taxation plays less of a role in company 
location decisions than right-wing politicians. However, the ideological bias is not always 
monotonic. For instance, members of the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) believe that in-
ternational profit shifting is much more prevalent than more right wing or liberal parties such 
as the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and market-oriented Free Democrats 
(FDP). We also obtain interesting insights with respect to the impact of the election mode by 
exploiting a particular feature of the German electoral system: About fifty percent of legisla-
tors in the German parliament are elected directly in districts, while the other half is elected 
via a party list, where seats are allocated to parties based on vote shares. Interestingly, party 
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list MPs with arguably less direct contacts to regional constituencies perceive a lower real tax 
elasticity of companies compared to directly elected politicians. 
Second, the yardstick competition hypothesis finds relatively little support in the Ger-
man Bundestag (see Besley and Case, 1995, for the seminal contribution and empirical evi-
dence for the U.S.). In general, German politicians don’t believe that voters care much about 
other countries’ tax policies. Controlling again for the politician’s mode of election, however, 
we find that directly elected politicians believe more strongly in the role of voters’ perception 
of other countries’ tax policies.  
We get our third main finding when we proceed to explain the perceived degree of na-
tional autonomy in tax setting and use the answers to the three previous questions (the chan-
nels of globalization and tax policy) as explanatory variables. In addition, we also allow party 
membership to directly explain the responses by legislators. Political economy considerations 
suggest that through the personal interest of a politician (e.g., high own capital income) party 
affiliation could matter if party membership were highly correlated with capital income. We 
find again a strong direct ideological bias. Ideology matters also indirectly, in particular via 
the profit shifting channel. Hence, party membership matters both directly and indirectly.  
Finally, we use the same approach to explain preferences for EU tax harmonization 
and find that minimum tax rates for companies are more strongly favoured by left wing par-
ties, even after controlling for the three globalization and tax policy channels. The direct ide-
ology effect is quantitatively more important than the three channels of globalization. Perhaps 
surprisingly, directly elected politicians tend to be more in favour of minimum tax rates.  
Several robustness checks indicate that our key results are not distorted by a possible 
selection bias in the survey and that party membership in the Bundestag has indeed an infor-
mation content with respect to the MP’s tax ideology.  
Our work relates to several other literatures (other than the tax competition literature 
mentioned above). Our research is complementary to Hanson, Scheve et al. (2005) and Mayda 
and Rodrik (2005) who are interested in the determinants of views on globalization. In con-
trast to our work, however, they focus on immigration and trade policies, respectively, and 
have only private households in their samples. Our survey of policy makers is novel and in-
teresting because policy makers tend to be better informed than most households and are more 
directly involved in actually choosing policies. The second literature to which we relate deals 
with the formation of beliefs about economic policies in general. Caplan (2002) and Blinder 
and Krueger (2004) also emphasize the role of ideology which is based on survey evidence 
from households and economists. Finally, the role of misconceptions and voter ignorance is 
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explored in explaining views on domestic tax policy in the U.S., such as Krupnikov et al.  
(2006) and Birney et al. (2006) on the repeal of the estate tax, and Slemrod (2003) on the re-
placement of the income tax by a flat or retail sales tax.  
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide relevant information 
relating to the German electoral and political system and the debate about company tax re-
form. We describe the survey and provide a summary of the descriptive data in section 3. In 
section 4 we present the structure of a simple two step approach in the formation of tax policy 
opinion and the estimation methodology. Subsequently, we turn in section 5 to our key find-
ings. Various robustness checks are analyzed in section 6 before we conclude with ideas for 
future work. 
 
 
2. Institutional background  
 
In this section we provide useful information on two items relating to our survey: first the 
German electoral and political system, and second actual company tax reform in Germany. 
 
German electoral and political system 
Germany is a parliamentary democracy. The parliament consists of two chambers, the lower 
house (Bundestag) and the upper house (Bundesrat), the latter representing the 16 states of 
Germany. The Bundestag elects the chancellor and thus controls the executive. Our survey is 
based on members of the Bundestag. The parliament consists of (at least) 598 members, who 
are elected every four years. There are 299 districts, and each district is represented by one 
person. The other half of the parliament is elected based on vote shares for party lists. We 
exploit this unique difference in election mode in our empirical analysis below. To be more 
specific, each voter has two votes. The first vote is for the preferred candidate of his/her dis-
trict, and the district representative is chosen using plurality rule. In most districts, the elected 
representative is from one of the two large parties (Social Democrats or Christian Democrats). 
The second vote is for a party (list). The overall seat allocation in parliament is based on na-
tional vote shares of the second vote (e.g., proportional representation) subject to the require-
ment that a party needs to catch at least 5% of the national vote or win three districts.  
A peculiarity of the German electoral system is that the share of the second vote de-
termines the share of total seats in parliament, even if a party has won more districts (based on 
the first vote) than it should obtain based on the second vote. For this reason additional seats 
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(“excess seats”) are granted to a party that has won more districts (from the first vote) than its 
proportional vote share would suggest. In the current German parliament (electoral period 
2005-9) initially there have been 614 (=598+16) seats due to 9 excess seats for the Social 
Democrats and 7 for the Christian Democrats.2  
Broadly speaking parties can be characterized as follows: The Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU) are a centre-right party, while the Social Democrats (SPD) represent the centre-
left. The Free Democrats (FDP) are liberals in the sense of favoring a small government and 
low taxes,  which makes them more market friendly than the Christian Democrats, who in 
turn are more market-oriented than the Social Democrats. The Left Party is drawing heavily 
on former communists in East Germany and disappointed Social Democrats from the left 
wing in West Germany. On economic policies the Left Party is to the left of the SPD. The 
Greens heavily focus on environmental and social issues, and are popular with relatively 
young, well educated people from the middle class. Party members have quite different views 
on economic policies though, ranging from market friendly and a preference for sustainable 
budgets to fairly interventionists views. 
 
Company tax reform in Germany 
In Germany tax rates on capital income, in particular corporate income, are high by interna-
tional standards. For example, the nominal tax burden on retained profits in 2006 is about 
37%, consisting of a 25% corporate tax rate plus local tax and the so-called solidarity charge. 
This makes Germany a high tax country among OECD and EU countries. A similar picture 
arises with respect to effective marginal tax rates (see Haufler, 2006, for recent data). For this 
reason the current government made up by Social Democrats and Christian Democrats agreed 
to reform company taxation after establishing the grand coalition in November 2005. The 
major objective of the government has been to make Germany’s tax system more competitive 
internationally, in particular for domestic and foreign investors in real capital. At the same 
time, there is fear about the shifting of paper profits out of Germany by multinational firms 
through means of transfer pricing and thin capitalization, and thus rules for securing tax reve-
nues in Germany are aimed at. 
Shortly after our survey the grand coalition of Christian and Social democrats presented a 
company tax reform bill (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007a) in the spring of 2007 to the 
Bundestag, which is based on the coalition agreement from 2005 and an initial draft in 2006. 
The tax reform bill changes twelve major laws all relating to company taxation and the taxa-
                                                 
2 Excess seats are lost when a MP withdraws from the Bundestag. Due to such an incidence the number of seats 
declined from 614 to 613 in June 2007. 
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tion of capital income, and thus is a major and complex legislation. The main items of the bill, 
as relevant for the context of our survey, are the following: 
− Reduction of nominal tax burden for retained profits by corporations from almost 39% to 
29,83%, mostly by a reduction of the corporate tax rate from 25 to 15%. A similar reduc-
tion for retained profits of non-corporations is contained.  
− Provisions regulating the extent of interest deductibility of loans. Multinational firms can 
deduct interest on intra-company loans fully only if the difference between interest paid 
and interest received is less than one 1 million Euros. Any excess can be expensed only at 
a lower rate and/or carried forward. 
− Various provisions relating to the definition of the corporate tax and local tax (Gewer-
besteuer), some benefiting other hurting firms overall. On net the marginal effective tax 
rates are intended to fall. 
− The overall fiscal revenue loss is estimated to be €5 billion annually in the long run (static 
effects, no behavioural adjustment assumed).  
 
The bill was passed with minor modifications by the Bundestag on May 25, 2007, and the 
upper house (Bundesrat) representing the state government on July 6, 2007 (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2007b). The new law will become effective on January 1, 2008. Of the majority 
coalition parties, two members of the Christian democrats abstained, while all others voted in 
support. For the Social Democrats two opposed the bill and 15 abstained. The three smaller 
parties all voted against the bill, albeit for very different reasons. The FDP supports the reduc-
tion in the corporate tax rate, but believes that the reform is too complex, the benefits for non-
corporations are too low and non-transparent, and the overall net reduction in company taxes 
is too small to have an impact. The exact opposite view is taken by the Left Party who views 
the tax bill as a major gift to large corporations and capital owners at the expense of low and 
middle income workers. The Green Party fears that the revenue impact is entirely unclear, 
non-corporations do not benefit enough, and various provisions will reduce rather than stimu-
late investment. 39 Members of Parliament were not present on the day of the vote.  
 
 
3. Survey and Data  
 
The survey among the members of the German Parliament (Bundestag) started in November 
2006 and the last responses were recorded in February 2007. The legislators were addressed 
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by written letters and subsequently by phone calls (when no initial response). 157 members of 
the German Bundestag participated by returning filled questionnaires resulting in a response 
rate of 25.6 percent with substantial differences across parties (see Table 1). Possible concerns 
about the differential response rate are addressed in our estimation approach and subsequent 
robustness checks. 
The questionnaire included the following questions (original questions in German are 
available upon request): 
 
The Globalization and Tax Policy Channels: 
− Question 1 (Q1) on real corporate mobility: “The level of company taxation is men-
tioned as one factor for the location decision of companies. How important do you believe 
is the level of company taxation in this context?” 
− Question 2 (Q2) on profit shifting: “Reports suggest that companies use tax planning 
strategies to shift paper profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. How widespread do 
you think is this phenomenon?” 
− Question 3 (Q3) on voter awareness: “Do you believe that voters consider tax rates in 
neighboring countries when forming an opinion on the appropriate level of company taxa-
tion in Germany?” 
 
Policy Questions: 
− Question 4 (Q4) on national autonomy: “Some people feel that globalization leads to a 
loss in national autonomy. Do you think that Germany still has any autonomy in the area 
of company taxation?” 
− Question 5 (Q5) on EU minimum tax: “In the current debate some have suggested that 
the EU should introduce a minimum tax for companies. Are you in favour of this pro-
posal?” 
 
Answers could be given on a discrete scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“very much”). 
The survey was conducted non-anonymously so that individual characteristics of re-
spondents could be identified, although non-anonymity may impact negatively on the honesty 
of answers. However, confidentiality of individual responses was guaranteed. Furthermore, a 
certain “hiding bias” should not distort the results if one assumes that it is not systematically 
correlated with other variables of interest.  
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Apart from party membership as the key variable for a MP’s ideological position we 
took account of variables related to a member’s education, her level of specialized informa-
tion and a group of further variables as summarized in Table 2. This information was com-
piled from the Bundestag website3. While the precise classification of variables is debatable, 
in particular the distinction between education and information variables, the classification is 
helpful in our view. Education should be relevant for the ability to process information, and 
the educational specialization (e.g., on economics or business) should hint towards the degree 
of information about globalization restrictions. Similarly we would expect that certain profes-
sional experience (e.g. as a self-employed), the length of Bundestag membership, and the 
membership in specialized Bundestag committees serve as useful proxies for the degree of 
information on the tax policy environment. 
Among other variables we include dummies to differentiate between Eastern and 
Western German, male and female, direct and party list MPs. We also account for age. The 
heterogeneity of the economic and political environment in Eastern and Western Germany 
may impact results also because Eastern Germans have a different view on the role of the 
state (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Empirical studies have also pointed to a signifi-
cantly different focus of female representatives compared to their male colleagues: Female 
legislators tend to have different policy priorities and are more likely to express concerns 
about social policy issues (Thomas, 1994; Seltzer et al., 1997). Hence, gender may be taken as 
a proxy for the specific policy specialization and, hence, interest for and information on tax 
issues. Finally, MPs elected directly in a district and not through a party list may have more 
direct contact with citizens and companies which could be relevant for the perception of glob-
alization constraints.4 
As pointed out in the introduction personal interests may well influence opinion. For 
this reason we also experimented with an additional variable that relates to income of legisla-
tors other than their uniform compensation for their status as member of parliament. This side 
income (“Nebeneinkünfte”) of MPs originates from occupations unrelated to the seat in 
Bundestag such as self-employment, membership in company supervisory bodies, paid 
speeches or other. Revenues from these activities are legal for German MPs, but - following a 
ruling of German’s constitutional court in summer 2007 - have to be published. Unfortu-
                                                 
3 www.bundestag.de which also presents the MP’s curricula vitae. 
4 The distinction between the two types of members of parliaments is somewhat blurry in so far as MPs elected 
via the party list are sometimes candidates in a district and were not elected. We also experimented with a modi-
fied party list variable taking account of the relative position of the MP on a party list relative to the maximum 
number of places on the list which in the election 2005 qualified for a seat in Bundestag (results not reported). 
This relative position did not prove to be important. 
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nately, the publication requirement is limited and requires information about income in three 
intervals so that the quality of the resulting data is relatively poor. This may explain that an 
inclusion of a side income variable did not have significant results, although from a theoreti-
cal point of view this variable could be a proxy for private interests or information aspects 
with respect to corporate tax policy. 
Finally, we also included basic economic characteristics of the individual MP’s federal 
state in order to allow for special interests related to a constituency’s specific needs. 
A first look at the descriptive data reveals that there is a strong correlation between 
ideology measured on the basis of party affiliation and the answers to the five questions (Ta-
ble 3).5 With the exception of the voter awareness question (Q3) responses to all questions 
differ by party affiliation. This outcome may not come as a complete surprise when normative 
issues such as the desirability of a EU minimum tax on companies is considered. However, 
the strong correlation of perceived globalization restrictions and ideology is harder to explain 
and may hint to an ideological bias in information processing, as it has been shown to be viru-
lent in the population at large for the perception of economic issues in general (Blinder and 
Krueger, 2004; Caplan, 2002). In the following we dig deeper into this question by disentan-
gling the ideological impact on globalization views from other influences related to education, 
information and the other individual characteristics of Bundestag members. 
 
 
4. The formation of tax policy opinions and estimation approach 
 
The rational formation of tax policy opinions can be described as a two step procedure. In a 
first step, decision makers collect information on the tax policy environment. With regard to 
globalization this relates to an assessment of three channels: first, the tax elasticity of real 
investment (RI), second, the tax elasticity of paper profits (PP) and third, the reaction of vot-
ers to tax developments abroad i.e., yardstick competition (YC). In a second step, decision 
makers choose the tax policy which maximizes their specific objective function. For example, 
they vote for minimum taxes (M) or they decide to which extent they stick to an autonomous 
tax policy (A) even at a cost of increasing outward mobility. 
Ideology (IDE) should directly influence the second step following conventional the-
ory. Representatives with different subjective equity-efficiency trade-offs should have differ-
ent tax policy preferences even if they fully agree on the relevance of the three globalization 
                                                 
5 In section 6 we address the link between ideology and party membership in detail. 
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and tax policy channels (e.g., see the standard Meltzer-Richard (1981) model of redistributive 
taxation in a closed economy). We would not expect that the perception of restrictions is also 
influenced by ideological views however. 
The appropriateness of these expectations on the impact of ideology is now tested 
within the following set-up: To analyze the formation of beliefs on tax policy restrictions un-
der globalization - the first step – models of the following type are considered:  
 
(1a)  PRI = f (EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
(1b)  PPP = f (EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
(1c)  PYC = f (EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
 
The perception P of each of the three channels may be influenced by the individual 
MP’s education EDU, his or her availability of objective information INF, other individual 
characteristics OIN, and particular economic characteristics of the legislator’s state STC as 
suggested above. If the usual modelling of rational formation of tax policy opinions is correct, 
however, ideology IDE should have no influence in the first step.  
In a second step the formation of tax policy opinions is finalized by translating the 
perceived restrictions into preferred policy options, which in turn depend on an individual’s 
objective function. Here we would expect that decision makers with similar perceptions of 
restrictions should tend to see more room for an autonomous tax policy if they put a relatively 
large weight on equity relative to efficiency. Similarly, the preference for minimum taxes 
should not only be influenced by the perceived restrictions but also by ideology because 
minimum taxes tend to offer more room for redistributive objectives. To test for the relative 
role of ideology in the second step, models of the following types are considered:  
 
 
(2a) A = f (PRI, PPP, PYC, EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
 
(2b)  M = f(PRM, PPP, PYC, EDU, INF, OIN, STC, IDE) 
 
 
The belief in tax autonomy (A) and the preference for an EU minimum tax (M) are modelled 
as a function of the perceived restrictions and of ideology directly. The impact of education, 
influence and other individual characteristics is included in the second step of formation of 
tax policy positions. 
 10
Our survey of the members of the German Bundestag allows us to test for the de-
scribed structure in the formation of tax policy opinions. We proceed by estimating ordered 
probit models for the answers Q1-Q3 representing the perceived restrictions according to the 
first step equations (1a)-(1c). We then continue by analyzing the second step by estimating 
ordered probit models for the answers to Q4 (related to equation 2a) and Q5 (equation 2b). 
Several standard problems of econometric testing of survey data have to be addressed 
(see Hanson et al., 2005 or Mayda and Rodrik, 2005, for similar approaches): The highly dif-
ferent response rates of different parties point to a selection bias which could influence esti-
mation results. Therefore, we estimate weighted ordered probit models, where weights correct 
for the sample’s lacking representativeness. Our weights are based on two strata of the sam-
ple: party membership and years in Bundestag which both are highly significant in a non-
response analysis. Even these measures cannot exclude that a selection bias can still in princi-
ple contaminate the results and we return to this issue in section 6. 
Furthermore the descriptive analysis indicates that the variance of answers differs 
widely between parties. To cope with the resulting problems we allow for party clustered er-
ror terms, i.e. the usual assumption of uncorrelated error terms is given up for observations 
from the same party. As a consequence, our estimation procedure is robust against unobserved 
variables or structures which lead to a larger homogeneity of answers within one party.  
The specification included the proxies for education, information, other individual 
characteristics and economic structure as they are listed in section 2.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
First step results 
Estimation results for the three first step model reveal a different overall fit of the models 
(Table 4). Whereas estimations show reasonable properties for the perception of real mobility 
and profit shifting, the estimation for yardstick competition has hardly explanatory power. 
There is support for the relevance of information proxies and less for the importance of educa-
tion. Economic state characteristics do not show up significantly apart from a weakly signifi-
cant impact of the unemployment rate in the yardstick competition equation. These results 
indicate that belief formation on German tax policy is not clearly linked to special interests of 
a MP’s constituency. 
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Among the information variables memberships in the financial committee responsible 
for tax policy, the length of Bundestag membership and professional experience as self-
employed lawyer, tax consultant etc. (“Freiberufler”) clearly influence the perception of the 
tax mobility environment. The MPs with a professional background as self-employed tend to 
stress the importance of paper profit mobility, while they regard real mobility as less impor-
tant compared to their colleagues among the members of Bundestag. Members of the financial 
committee who should - with regard to tax policy - be the best informed members of 
Bundestag tend to stress real mobility as a relevant restriction. The same holds for those MPs 
with a longer tenure in the Bundestag. The other variables – Eastern/Western German, gender, 
party list and age – also turn out to be important although to a different degree for the three 
channels. Female members assess globalization restrictions to be more severe compared to 
their male colleagues. Eastern German MPs have fewer concerncs about profit shifting. Party 
list MPs assess real mobility and yardstick competition as less pronounced than MPs voted 
into the parliament directly by a district - a plausible result given the fact that district repre-
sentatives should have more salient experience with company decision making. 
Beyond these detailed findings, however, the essential result is the clear and over-
whelming impact of ideology on the perception of globalization restrictions. Thus, the finding 
of the descriptive data analysis (Table 3) is obviously no statistical artefact and is strongly 
supported in the multivariate model. Ideology measured on the basis of party membership is 
not only highly significant. Judged on the size of marginal effects (for each question evaluated 
at the most frequent answer category) party membership also outweighs the impact of infor-
mation, education or other variables where these ideological marginal effects are particularly 
pronounced for real mobility. It is striking that the ordering of party effects for the perception 
of real mobility corresponds to the left right spectre: Compared to the liberal FDP the parties 
regard real mobility of companies the less important the further left their political orientation 
is. Our results strongly reject the hypothesis that ideology is unimportant in the first step of 
opinion building. Hence, our results challenge the key assumption of standard models of tax 
policy decision making, in which an objective mobility of tax bases is assumed. 
 
Second step results 
The results for the estimation of ordered probit models for answers to Q4 (autonomy) and Q5 
(minimum taxes) are presented in Table 5. Based on models (2a) and (2b) we would expect 
that two classes of variables are important: on the one hand the perceived globalization re-
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strictions and on the other hand individual characteristics linked to a MP’s education, infor-
mation, her state’s economic characteristics and ideology.  
The regression diagnostics show a good fit, as both models show a high share of cor-
rect classifications. The first surprising result of the second step results is the loose link be-
tween perceived restrictions on the one hand and the perception of tax autonomy and the 
minimum tax preference on the other hand. Among the three globalization channels only per-
ceived paper profit mobility is significant in both equations. As expected, a larger perceived 
profit shifting is associated with less autonomy and a larger preference for minimum taxes. 
Real mobility is weakly significant in the autonomy equation but with a surprising sign: Per-
ception of high real mobility is associated with a more autonomous assessment. Education 
variables are significant: a degree qualifying for university entry is associated with a percep-
tion of less autonomy and less marked preferences for tax harmonization. Interestingly, a uni-
versity degree increases the perceived autonomy. Information variables have more importance 
for the view on harmonization than on autonomy. With more years in the Bundestag the pref-
erences for minimum taxes decline. Perhaps not surprisingly, members of the budgetary 
committee see more autonomy compared to other MPs. Apart from that they are characterized 
by more scepticism towards EU minimum taxes. Formerly self-employed “Freiberufler” have 
a stronger tendency to favour minimum taxes. Among the other variables only the Eastern 
Germany and the party list dummy are significant: MPs directly elected by a district show 
significantly larger sympathy for minimum taxes, representatives from the Eastern part of the 
country see less autonomy. State characteristics are of importance in the minimum tax model 
insofar as MPs both from relatively wealthy states and states with high unemployment prefer 
minimum taxes more than others.  
The essential result with respect to the impact of party membership is again its high 
significance. While the size of marginal effects for party membership in the autonomy equa-
tion is comparable to the other types of variables, party affiliation by far outweighs the others 
in the explanation of tax harmonization preferences. The impact of ideology in the second 
step is less surprising compared to the first step results because subjective equity-efficiency 
trade-offs should influence the formation of tax policy opinions for a given perception of re-
strictions. 
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6. Robustness 
 
We argued above that ideology strongly affects the perception of tax competition channels. 
An essential question is whether party membership in our survey is really a good proxy for 
ideology. Two kinds of problems have to be discussed, first with respect to the nature of par-
ties and the belief formation within parliamentary party factions and, second, with respect to 
the technical issue of selection bias in our survey. 
 
Belief formation within a party faction: 
For a legislator party membership is a variable representing a complex set of issues. For ex-
ample, Murphy and Shleifer (2004) suggest that parties can be regarded as social networks 
which allow for an easy influence on opinions of network members. Party members and legis-
lators from a specific party in particular could thus be the victims of party manipulation ac-
tivities. Thus it is unclear whether the statistical significance of party membership is really the 
consequence of deeply rooted ideology and resulting psychological process of information 
filtering or the consequence of party information processes. An example in the context of the 
German company tax reform is the Social-Democratic finance minister Peer Steinbrück’s 
strategy to cope with resistance in his party and trade unions against tax cuts for companies. 
In reaction to this he stressed the base broadening elements of the reform as a means to fight 
paper profit mobility6. Thus, the argument of high paper profit mobility was highly present in 
the SPD’s reform debate. In this sense, the concern of social-democratic legislators about 
profit shifting (Table 3, Table 4) could to a certain extent mirror the effect of this information 
campaign. 
Furthermore, the individual MP is heavily dependent on the support of his party for his 
further career prospects. Hence, the impact of party membership as measured in our analysis 
may represent phenomena like group dependence, loyalty or information biases and is there-
fore no undistorted proxy for ideology. Even though in our survey confidentiality was assured 
and even though such a survey is much less prone to loyalty distortions compared to studies 
of actual behaviour in roll call votes there could distorting effects cannot be excluded. 
 
                                                 
6 In a typcial statement addressing his party members Steinbrück argues: “Through tax cuts and targeted meas-
ures against profit shifting this reform will provide a constant decrease of the fairness gap between profits real-
ized in Germany and profits actually taxed” (Steinbrück, 2007). 
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Selection bias 
On a technical level, the identification of ideology on the basis of party membership may be 
impeded by a selection bias. Highly different response rates between party factions (see Table 
1) imply the risk that party membership could simply mirror the effect of hidden variables 
having an impact on participation in the survey. Therefore, without further checks we cannot 
be certain that our party membership variable truly reflects ideology.  
 
Control group results 
As a first approach to check the importance of both caveats we conducted an identical survey 
among a control group of economics students at the University of Mannheim in February 
2007. In addition to five questions explained in section 3, students were asked to reveal their 
party preferences. The survey was conducted anonymously. Obviously, loyalty considera-
tions, political career aspects or specific information networks do not play a role for this con-
trol group. Thus, the resulting data allow to check for the link between ideology and global-
ization perceptions because party preference is a more unambiguous proxy of ideology than in 
the case of the Bundestag. As information proxies we included two questions: One for the 
number of semesters which the student has already been studying economics and a second 
question whether the student had already attended an introductory public finance lecture. 
Among other individual characteristics the respondents were asked to indicate gender and 
nationality (German/non-German). 
Tables 6 and 7 present the results for the three tax competition channels (model 1a, 1b 
and 1c) and the second step regressions (model 2a and 2b) for the control group. Similar to 
the survey among legislators the real mobility and paper profit equations perform better than 
the yardstick competition equation. Again party association has a highly significant impact on 
the perception of competition phenomena. For real mobility, even the ordering of the party 
impact is identical to the Bundestag results: The further left is the party preference the lower 
is the importance assigned to real mobility. For paper profit mobility the ordering of party 
effects is quite different however: While individuals with preference for the SPD the effect is 
not significant different from those who favour the liberal FDP (our reference case), students 
who prefer the other parties perceive less paper profit mobility compared to the FDP support-
ers. For the Bundestag, the governing parties SPD and CDU/CSU are characterized by a par-
ticularly high awareness of paper profit mobility. For the second step results it is striking that 
perceived restrictions do not appear to be linked at all to the autonomy perception or the pref-
 15
erence for minimum taxes. Thus, the surprising result of a weak impact of restrictions relative 
to ideology in the second step is even reinforced by the control group results. 
Taken together the control group results provide reassurance that the key Bundestag 
results about the impact of ideology in both steps are no statistical artefact caused by either 
party faction effects or a selection bias in the Bundestag survey. However, the different order-
ing of party effects in the paper profit equation indicates that the Bundestag party effect is to a 
certain extent also influenced by specific information processes within the parliament. 
 
Party membership and ideology 
So far we assumed that party membership reflects ideology. As a further check for the genu-
inely information content of our Bundestag party variable with regard to ideology we now 
make use of a sixth survey  question on the role of corporate taxation for equity.  
 
− Question 6 (Q6) on equity: “At a general level, do you think that taxation of companies 
is important from an equity perspective?” 
 
This question is neither related to the perception of tax competition nor to specific tax policy 
preferences and targets at a rather pure ideological assessment. We relate the answers to Q6 
and party membership in an analogous model framework to models 2a/2b. Table 8 presents 
the results where party effects are not only highly significant but their marginal effects are 
also dominating all other effects by far. This impressively underlines the link between party 
membership and general tax ideology in line with the left-right ordering of political parties: 
Compared to the market-oriented FDP point of reference all party effects are highly signifi-
cant where the emphasis on equity is the stronger the further left is the party in the political 
spectre. Reinforcing our control group insights the result makes us very confident in ruling 
out a selection bias that contaminates the party membership variable and render it useless as 
an ideological proxy. 
 
Estimating the first step without ideological variables 
As a final robustness check, Table 9 reproduces the first step regressions (models 1a, 1b, 1c) 
but drops the party affiliation dummy. This check allows us to assess the additional explana-
tory power of party affiliation given possible collinearity between individual characteristics of 
legislators and party affiliation. For example, compared to their colleagues market-oriented 
legislators from the FDP have significantly more often a degree in economics/business or ex-
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perience as self-employed. Similarly, representatives of the Left Party are more often from 
Eastern Germany than from Western Germany. This raises the question as to whether the pure 
party effect contributes significantly to the overall fit of the model. Our evidence strongly 
suggests that party effects are important. In all regressions the joint significance of party vari-
ables is always highly significant. Moreover, the reduced regressions also point to a signifi-
cant improvement of the models through the inclusion of party dummies albeit not for all 
three channels of tax competition. For real mobility and paper profit mobility the drop of 
party variables leads to a deterioration in the goodness of fit including the share of correct 
classifications. The deterioration is extremely strong in the real mobility equation (drop from 
0.26 to 0.17). By contrast, the predictive power of the model does not suffer from dropping 
party membership in the case of the yardstick competition equation. This confirms our insight 
that yardstick competition is not an issue in the view of Bundestag legislators. 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to survey the opinions of policy makers 
with respect to tax policy at a time of increasing international integration. Policy makers are 
an interesting group to consider, as they actually vote on policies directly and probably are 
better informed than average citizens. The survey of German legislators was done at a time 
when tax policy reform was high on the agenda and a few months after the survey the 
Bundestag actually voted on a reform bill that will lower the statutory and effective tax rates 
on companies in Germany. The main finding of our analysis is the identification of a strong 
ideological bias in the legislators’ views on the interaction between globalization and tax pol-
icy. Our analysis suggests that the perceived efficiency cost of taxation in open economies 
differ systematically. This is clearly in contrast to how economists have modelled decision 
making on tax policy in the past. 
One caveat is important. At this point we are unable to identify the precise mechanism which 
is responsible for the strong impact of ideology. The insights from the perception of paper 
profit shifting indicate that specific information networks or campaigns could have an impact 
in shaping party members‘ views. Nevertheless our key result for a strong impact of ideology 
in the perception of globalization remains valid even if we are not yet able to identify the pre-
cise mechanism.   
 17
Future research should attempt to overcome our incomplete understanding of the dif-
ferent perceptions. One way to tackle the issue is to get more information from the policy 
makers themselves, for example, by asking them how they form their opinion. We did not 
pursue this possibility with the legislators from the German Bundestag, as it proved fairly 
difficult to get them to answer just our six questions. We expect more willingness to partici-
pate when policy makers from lower level of governments are surveyed. In this context we 
plan to survey policy makers from competing jurisdictions and to compare their perceived 
degree of competition with estimates from a strategic interaction model where actual tax rates 
are the key endogenous variables. This approach would allow us to find independent confir-
mation for or modification of existing theories of fiscal competition. 
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Table 1: Response rate by party in the Bundestag 
Party  Number of seats Responses Response rate 
CDU/CSU 225 53 23,56 
SPD 222 33 14,86 
FDP 61 32 52,46 
Left Party 53 27 50,94 
Alliance 90/The Greens 51 12 23,53 
Members without fraction 2 0 0,00 
Total 614 157 25,57 
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Table 2: Variable definitions 
Variable Unit Explanations 
 
Education variables 
Abitur  Dummy Secondary qualification for university entrance 
Tertiary degree Dummy  Degree from university or polytechnic 
 
Proxies for degree of information and experience 
Economics/business Dummy Tertiary education in business administration or eco-
nomics 
Self-employed 
“Freiberufler” 
Dummy Last professional position as an independent lawyer, 
tax advisor or in a similar self-employed occupation 
Years in Bundestag Discrete 
variable 
Calculated as 2007 minus year of Bundestag entry, 
interruptions are taken into account 
Member financial 
committee 
Dummy Deals with tax policy, financial markets, monetary policy
Member budget 
committee 
Dummy Deals with federal government budget, in particular 
expenditure side 
 
Other variables 
Eastern Germany Dummy Member of parliament from a district or a party list in 
Eastern Germany  
Female Dummy  
Party list Dummy Not elected directly from a district but qualified for 
Bundestag by position on a party list 
Age Discrete 
variable 
Calculated as 2007 minus year of birth 
State characteristics 
Unemployment rate Continuous 
variable 
in % for the year 2006, source: German Statistical Of-
fice 
GDP per capita  Continuous 
variable 
In Euro for the year 2006, source: German Statistical 
Office 
Sources: Bundestag if no other source is named. 
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Table 3: Survey results by party membership 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Q1 Real corporate mobility 
FDP 32 7.41 1.36 3 9 
CDU/CSU 53 6.68 1.48 3 9 
SPD 33 5.76 1.52 2 9 
Greens 12 4.67 1.50 3 8 
Left Party 27 3.93 1.47 2 8 
Total 157 6.01 1.88 2 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.000 
Q2 Profit shifting 
FDP 31 5.81 1.60 3 8 
CDU/CSU 53 6.21 1.54 3 9 
SPD 33 7.55 1.52 2 9 
Greens 12 7.00 1.04 5 8 
Left Party 27 7.07 1.88 3 9 
Total 156 6.62 1.69 2 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.000 
Q3 Voter awareness 
FDP 32 4.50 2.66 1 9 
CDU/CSU 53 4.25 1.95 1 9 
SPD 33 3.55 1.94 1 8 
Greens 12 4.08 2.07 1 7 
Left Party 27 4.19 1.78 1 7 
Total 157 4.13 2.09 1 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.444 
Q4 National autonomy 
FDP 32 6.53 1.67 2 9 
CDU/CSU 53 6.72 1.56 3 9 
SPD 33 5.94 1.20 3 7 
Greens 12 6.50 0.67 6 8 
Left Party 27 7.37 1.71 2 9 
Total 157 6.61 1.54 2 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.009 
Q5 EU minimum taxes 
FDP 32 2.50 2.36 1 8 
CDU/CSU 52 4.48 2.75 1 9 
SPD 33 7.82 1.76 3 9 
Greens 12 7.33 1.07 5 9 
Left Party 26 8.35 0.98 6 9 
Total 155 5.65 3.08 1 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.000 
Q6 Equity 
FDP 32 5.38 2.04 1 9 
CDU/CSU 52 6.81 1.63 3 9 
SPD 33 7.61 1.64 3 9 
Greens 12 7.67 1.07 6 9 
Left Party 27 8.59 0.64 7 9 
Total 156 7.06 1.88 1 9 
Anova, F-Test p-value: 0.000 
 
Table 4: Ordered probit estimation: Tax policy restrictions 
Q1: Mobility real capital 
Model 1a 
Q2: Mobility paper profits 
Model 1b 
Q3: Yardstick competition 
Model 1c 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* 
Education 
Secondary (“Abitur”) 0.363** (0.156) 0.053 
0.237 
(0.306) 0.007 
0.055 
(0.215) -0.013 
Tertiary 0.135 (0.216) 0.019 
-0.222 
(0.594) 0.003 
-0.228 
(0.231) 0.053 
Information 
Economic/business -0.145 (0.461) -0.020 
-0.181 
(0.139) -0.004 
-0.036 
(0.255) 0.008 
“Freiberufler” -0.373*** (0.129) -0.055 
0.394*** 
(0.135) -0.012 
0.263** 
(0.134) -0.061 
Years in Bundestag 0.055*** (0.014) 0.007 
-0.042*** 
(0.011) 0.000 
-0.003 
(0.016) 0.001 
Member financial 
committee 
0.457*** 
(0.127) 0.051 
-0.107 
(0.160) -0.002 
0.182* 
(0.109) -0.043 
Member budget 
committee 
-0.300 
(0.261) -0.043 
0.341 
(0.392) -0.008 
-0.030 
(0.140) 0.007 
Other individual characteristics 
Eastern Germany 0.301 (0.241) 0.037 
-0.779*** 
(0.200) -0.061 
0.688*** 
(0.221) -0.150 
Female 0.583*** (0.203) 0.067 
0.273 
(0.169) -0.002 
0.157 
(0.161) -0.037 
Party list -0.283** (0.116) -0.038 
-0.062 
(0.098) -0.001 
-0.439** 
(0.203) 0.102 
Age -0.016** (0.008) -0.002 
0.006 
(0.007) 0.000 
0.004 
(0.008) -0.001 
State characteristics 
Unemployment rate 0.020 (0.023) 0.003 
0.101 
(0.078) 0.001 
-0.060* 
(0.036) 0.014 
GDP per capita 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
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Party 
CDU/CSU -0.795*** (0.076) -0.110 
0.170 
(0.169) 0.000 
-0.276** 
(0.108) 0.065 
SPD -1.522*** (0.156) -0.190 
1.155*** 
(0.226) -0.036 
-0.656*** 
(0.101) 0.149 
GREENS -2.215*** (0.128) -0.235 
0.501*** 
(0.094) -0.025 
-0.363*** 
(0.102) 0.083 
LEFT PARTY -2.856*** (0.274) -0.248 
1.019*** 
(0.247) -0.096 
-0.034 
(0.209) 0.008 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint signifi-
cance of variables 0.000 0.068 0.000 
p-value joint signifi-
cance party dum-
mies 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 157 156 157 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute 
classification error 
<=1) 
0.261/0.745 0.244/0.718 0.204/0.484 
Pseudo-R2 0.130 0.090 0.026 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q1: 7, Q2: 7, Q3: 2); */**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
 
 
 23
Table 5: Ordered probit estimation: Tax policy 
Q4: Autonomy of tax policy 
Model 2a 
Q5: Preference minimum taxes 
Model 2b 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* 
Perceived restrictions 
Real mobility (Q1) 0.196* (0.113) 0.025 
-0.100 
(0.062) -0.025 
Paper profits (Q2) -0.073** (0.033) -0.009 
0.177** 
(0.089) 0.044 
Yardstick (Q3) 0.012 (0.052) 0.002 
-0.045 
(0.071) -0.011 
Education 
Secondary (“Abitur”) -0.414*** (0.150) -0.036 
-0.442* 
(0.232) -0.123 
Tertiary 0.669*** (0.150) 0.123 
-0.130 
(0.407) -0.034 
Information 
Economic/business 0.185 (0.158) 0.021 
0.007 
(0.230) 0.002 
“Freiberufler” 0.143 (0.267) 0.016 
0.382*** 
(0.086) 0.107 
Years in Bundestag -0.031 (0.025) -0.004 
-0.040** 
(0.016) -0.010 
Member financial com-
mittee 
0.168 
(0.283) 0.019 
-0.229 
(0.223) -0.053 
Member budget commit-
tee 
0.245* 
(0.139) 0.025 
-0.404* 
(0.220) -0.088 
Other individual characteristics 
Eastern Germany -0.403* (0.220) -0.067 
-0.046 
(0.318) -0.011 
Female -0.022 (0.162) -0.003 
-0.178 
(0.119) -0.043 
Party list -0.012 (0.284) -0.002 
-0.584*** 
(0.137) -0.148 
Age 0.009 (0.014) 0.001 
0.019 
(0.014) 0.005 
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State characteristics 
Unemployment rate 0.071 (0.059) 0.009 
0.113* 
(0.068) 0.028 
GDP per capita 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 
0.000** 
(0.000) 0.000 
Party 
CDU/CSU 0.362* (0.204) 0.040 
0.563*** 
(0.113) 0.150 
SPD 0.013 (0.177) 0.002 
2.038*** 
(0.115) 0.582 
GREENS 0.438 (0.379) 0.028 
1.835*** 
(0.266) 0.630 
LEFT PARTY 1.460*** (0.344) -0.107 
2.666*** 
(0.244) 0.814 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 0.000 
p-value joint significance 
party dummies 0.000 0.000 
Observations 156 154 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute classi-
fication error <=1) 
0.376/0.732 0.413/0.671 
Pseudo-R2 0.081 0.208 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q4: 7, Q5: 9); */**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 6: Ordered probit estimation control group: Tax policy restrictions 
Q1: Mobility real capital 
Model 1a 
Q2: Mobility paper profits 
Model 1b 
Q3: Yardstick competition 
Model 1c 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* 
Information 
Public finance lecture -0.341 (0.288) 0.026 
-0.891*** 
(0.185) 0.039 
-0.208 
(0.285) 0.027 
Number of semesters 0.234** (0.098) -0.015 
0.083 
(0.100) -0.001 
0.150 
(0.166) -0.019 
Other individual characteristics 
German 0.117 (0.293) -0.006 
0.276 
(0.171) 0.203 
-0.021 
(0.530) 0.702 
Female 0.559* (0.312) -0.054 
0.291*** 
(0.111) 0.413*** 
-0.057*** 
(0.109) 0.000 
Party 
CDU/CSU -0.192** (0.086) 0.009 
-0.489*** 
(0.103) -0.014 
0.197 
(0.185) -0.027 
SPD -0.426*** (0.056) 0.018 
0.007 
(0.053) 0.000 
0.384*** 
(0.117) -0.052 
GREENS -0.427*** (0.112) 0.002 
-0.993*** 
(0.153) -0.104 
0.804*** 
(0.275) -0.137 
LEFT PARTY -1.484*** (0.263) -0.189 
-0.802*** 
(0.283) -0.082 
-0.351 
(0.373) 0.028 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value joint significance 
party dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 72 72 72 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute clas-
sification error <=1) 
0.325/0.554 0.349/0.675 0.277/0.506 
Pseudo-R2 0.038 0.061 0.029 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q1: 6, Q2: 7, Q3: 3); */**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
Table 7: Ordered probit estimation control group: Tax policy 
Q4: Autonomy of tax policy 
Model 2a 
Q5: Preference minimum taxes 
Model 2b 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* 
Perceived restrictions 
Real mobility (Q1) -0.033 (0.103) -0.003 
0.018 
(0.100) -0.003 
Paper profits (Q2) -0.012 (0.070) -0.001 
0.004 
(0.134) -0.001 
Yardstick (Q3) -0.002 (0.031) 0.000 
-0.052 
(0.062) 0.007 
Information 
Public finance lecture 0.668* (0.400) 0.060 
-0.052 
(0.428) 0.007 
Number of semesters -0.166** (0.075) -0.013 
-0.059 
(0.134) 0.008 
Other individual characteristics 
German 0.205 (0.539) 0.020 
0.622* 
(0.336) -0.061 
Female -0.085 (0.475) -0.007 
-0.218 
(0.553) 0.030 
Party preference 
CDU/CSU 0.227*** (0.055) 0.014 
0.214 
(0.311) -0.032 
SPD 0.395*** (0.098) 0.024 
1.430*** 
(0.277) -0.195 
GREENS -0.543*** (0.098) -0.065 
1.110** 
(0.565) -0.167 
LEFT PARTY -1.551*** (0.302) -0.212 
-0.201* 
(0.111) 0.026 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 0.000 
p-value joint significance 
party dummies 0.000 0.000 
Observations 72 72 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute classi-
fication error <=1) 
0.229/0.518 0.244/0.439 
Pseudo-R2 0.056 0.076 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q4: 6, Q5: 3); 
*/**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 8: Ordered probit estimation for Q6 - equity and company taxation 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect* 
Education 
Secondary (“Abitur”) -0.497*** 
(0.179) -0.163 
Tertiary 0.094 
(0.149) 0.028 
Information 
Economic/business  -0.445 
(0.346) -0.120 
“Freiberufler” -0.219 
(0.220) -0.062 
Years in Bundestag -0.032 
(0.027) -0.010 
Member financial com-
mittee 
0.489** 
(0.227) 0.161 
Member budget commit-
tee 
-0.277 
(0.314) -0.077 
Other individual characteristics 
Eastern Germany -0.211 
(0.193) -0.060 
Female 0.318** 
(0.146) 0.100 
Party list -0.221*** 
(0.053) -0.067 
Age 0.005 
(0.009) 0.002 
State characteristics 
Unemployment rate 0.067 
(0.057) 0.020 
GDP per capita 0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
Party 
CDU/CSU 0.816*** 
(0.096) 0.260 
SPD 1.040*** 
(0.131) 0.334 
GREENS 1.408*** 
0.156) 0.513 
LEFT PARTY 2.076*** 
(0.200) 0.698 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 
p-value joint significance 
party dummies 0.000 
Observations 156 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute clas-
sification error <=1) 
0.365/0.654 
Pseudo-R2 0.100 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (9); 
*/**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 9: Ordered probit estimation: Tax policy restrictions - robustness check without party dummies 
Q1: Mobility real capital 
Model 1a 
Q2: Mobility paper profits 
Model 1b 
Q3: Yardstick competition 
Model 1c 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* Coefficient Marginal effect* 
Education 
Secondary (“Abitur”) 0.328 (0.262) 0.037 
0.243 
(0.237) 0.007 
-0.007 
(0.227) 0.002 
Tertiary 0.149 (0.209) 0.016 
-0.263 
(0.405) 0.003 
-0.198 
(0.223) 0.046 
Information 
Economic/business 0.060 (0.382) 0.006 
-0.370*** 
(0.071) -0.015 
0.060 
(0.191) -0.014 
“Freiberufler” 0.014 (0.123) 0.001 
0.210 
(0.159) -0.002 
0.318** 
(0.137) -0.072 
Years in Bundestag 0.052*** (0.015) 0.005 
-0.040*** 
(0.013) 0.000 
-0.006 
(0.016) 0.001 
Member financial com-
mittee 
0.398*** 
(0.142) 0.032 
-0.170 
(0.139) -0.004 
0.165 
(0.133) -0.038 
Member budget commit-
tee 
-0.271 
(0.310) -0.030 
0.243 
(0.316) -0.002 
0.037 
(0.087) -0.009 
Other individual characteristics 
Eastern Germany 0.136 (0.268) 0.013 
-0.723*** 
(0.182) -0.051 
0.753*** 
(0.203) -0.160 
Female 0.217 (0.184) 0.020 
0.469*** 
(0.167) -0.005 
0.078 
(0.130) -0.018 
Party list -0.406 (0.323) -0.039 
-0.057 
(0.145) -0.001 
-0.299** 
(0.130) 0.069 
Age -0.009 (0.009) -0.001 
0.008 
(0.008) 0.000 
0.002 
(0.008) 0.000 
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State characteristics 
Unemployment rate 0.008 (0.016) 0.001 
0.091 
(0.066) 0.001 
-0.057* 
(0.033) 0.013 
GDP per capita 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
0.000* 
(0.000) 0.000 
Regression diagnostics 
p-value joint significance 
of variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 157 156 157 
Share correct 
classifications 
(exact hit/absolute clas-
sification error <=1) 
0.166/0.516 0.231/0.647 0.229/0.465 
Pseudo-R2 0.038 0.045 0.016 
Party: FDP (liberal party) dummy not included; *marginal effect at mode (Q1: 7, Q2: 7, Q3: 2); */**/***: significant at 10/5/1 percent level. 
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